117TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION	<b>S.</b>
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To provide for the appropriate balance of empowering diplomats to pursue vital diplomatic goals and mitigating security risks at United States diplomatic posts, and for other purposes.

## IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr.	Murphy	introduced t	he followin	g bill;	which	was	read	${\rm twice}$	and	referr	ed
		to the Cor	nmittee on								

## A BILL

- To provide for the appropriate balance of empowering diplomats to pursue vital diplomatic goals and mitigating security risks at United States diplomatic posts, and for other purposes.
  - 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
  - 2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
  - 3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
  - 4 This Act may be cited as the "Expeditionary Diplo-
  - 5 macy Act of 2021".
  - 6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
  - 7 Congress makes the following findings:

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(1) A robust overseas diplomatic presence is the sine qua non of an effective foreign policy, particularly in unstable environments where a flexible and timely diplomatic response can be decisive in preventing and addressing violent conflict.

- (2) Diplomats routinely put themselves and their families at great personal risk to serve their country overseas where they increasingly face threats related to international terrorism, violent conflict, and public health, among others.
- (3) The Department of State has a remarkable record of protecting personnel while enabling an enormous amount of global diplomatic activity, often in insecure and remote places and facing a variety of evolving risks and threats, from terrorism to sonic attacks. With support from Congress, the Department of State has revised policy, improved physical security through retrofitting and replacing old facilities, deployed additional security personnel and armored vehicles, and greatly enhanced training requirements and facilities, including the new Foreign Affairs Security Training Center in Blackstone, Virginia.
- (4) However, there is broad consensus that the pendulum has swung too far toward eliminating risk,

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excessively inhibiting diplomatic activity; instead of protecting diplomats that authorize calculated risks, human psychology combined with Department of State policy incentivize extending embassy closures, reducing footprints, and postponing or denying travel requests.

- (5) Congress must accept responsibility for its part in perpetuating a risk-averse culture, as its oversight too often promotes the myth that all security incidents are avoidable and appears more focused on finding scapegoats than improving policy; the Accountability Review Board requirement in the Diplomatic Security Act (22 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.) particularly furthers this perception.
- (6) The impact of reduced diplomatic engagement is both difficult to distill and undeniable; while the cost of an embassy closure or cancelled meeting is hard to measure, diplomatic missions rely on robust staffing and ambitious external engagement to advance United States interests as diverse as fighting terrorism and transnational organized crime, preventing and addressing violent conflict and humanitarian disasters, promoting United States busirights nesses and trade, protecting the of

1	marginalized groups, addressing climate change, and
2	preventing pandemic disease.
3	(7) Despite the fact that Congress currently
4	provides annual appropriations in excess of
5	\$1,900,000,000 for embassy security, construction,
6	and maintenance, the Department of State is unable
7	to fully transform this considerable investment into
8	true overseas presence given excessive restrictions
9	that inhibit the ability of diplomats to—
10	(A) meet with foreign leaders to explain,
11	defend, and advance United States priorities;
12	(B) understand and report on foreign po-
13	litical, social, and economic conditions;
14	(C) provide United States citizen services
15	that are often a matter of life and death in in-
16	secure places; and
17	(D) collaborate and, at times, compete
18	with other diplomatic missions.
19	(8) Such restrictions present a clear and
20	present danger to the core interests of the United
21	States and contribute to the larger militarization of
22	our national security, as military and intelligence
23	agencies benefit from fewer security restrictions,
24	greater risk tolerance, and less congressional scru-
25	tiny in the wake of security incidents.

1	(9) Given these stakes, Congress has a respon-
2	sibility to empower, support, and hold the Depart-
3	ment of State accountable for implementing an ag-
4	gressive presence strategy that mitigates potential
5	risks and adequately considers the myriad direct and
6	indirect consequences of a lack of presence.
7	SEC. 3. ENCOURAGING EXPEDITIONARY DIPLOMACY.
8	(a) Purpose.—Subsection (b) of section 102 of the
9	Diplomatic Security Act (22 U.S.C. 4801(b)) is amend-
10	ed—
11	(1) by amending paragraph (3) to read as fol-
12	lows:
13	"(3) to promote strengthened security meas-
14	ures, institutionalize a culture of learning, and, in
15	the case of apparent gross negligence or breach of
16	duty, recommend the Director General of the For-
17	eign Service investigate accountability for United
18	States Government personnel with security-related
19	responsibilities;";
20	(2) by redesignating paragraphs (4) and (5) as
21	paragraphs (5) and (6), respectively; and
22	(3) by inserting after paragraph (3) the fol-
23	lowing new paragraph:
24	"(4) to support a culture of risk management,
25	instead of risk avoidance, that enables to Depart-

1	ment of State to pursue its vital goals with full
2	knowledge that it is not desirable nor possible for
3	the Department to avoid all risks;".
4	(b) Briefings on Embassy Security.—Section
5	105(a) of the Diplomatic Security Act (22 U.S.C.
6	4804(a)) is amended—
7	(1) by striking "monthly briefings" and insert-
8	ing "quarterly briefings";
9	(2) in paragraph (1)—
10	(A) by striking "any plans to open or re-
11	open a high risk, high threat post" and insert-
12	ing "progress towards opening or reopening
13	high risk, high threat posts, the risk to national
14	security of the continued closure and remaining
15	barriers to doing so";
16	(B) in subparagraph (A), by striking "the
17	type and level of security threats such post
18	could encounter" and inserting "the risk to na-
19	tional security of the post's continued closure";
20	and
21	(C) in subparagraph (C), by inserting "the
22	type and level of security threats such post
23	could encounter, and" before "security
24	'tripwires' ''.

1	SEC. 4. REPLACEMENT OF ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW
2	BOARD WITH SECURITY REVIEW COMMITTEE.
3	(a) In General.—Section 301 of the Diplomatic Se-
4	curity Act (22 U.S.C. 4831) is amended—
5	(1) in the section heading, by striking "AC-
6	COUNTABILITY REVIEW BOARDS" and inserting
7	"SECURITY REVIEW COMMITTEES";
8	(2) in subsection (a)—
9	(A) in paragraph (1), by striking "shall
10	convene an Accountability Review Board (in
11	this title referred to as the 'Board'). The Sec-
12	retary shall not convene the Board" and insert-
13	ing "shall convene the Security Review Com-
14	mittee (in this title referred to as the 'SRC').
15	The Secretary shall not convene the SRC";
16	(B) in paragraph (2), by striking "Board"
17	and inserting "SRC"; and
18	(C) in paragraph (3)(A)—
19	(i) in the subparagraph heading, by
20	striking "BOARD" and inserting "SRCs";
21	and
22	(ii) by striking "Board" and inserting
23	"SRC";
24	(3) in subsection (b)—
25	(A) in the subsection heading, by striking
26	"Boards" and inserting "Srcs"; and

1	(B) by striking "Board" each place it ap-
2	pears and inserting "SRC"; and
3	(4) in subsection (c), by striking "Board" each
4	place it appears and inserting "SRC".
5	(b) Membership.—Section 302 of the Diplomatic
6	Security Act (22 U.S.C. 4832) is amended—
7	(1) in the section heading, by striking "AC-
8	COUNTABILITY REVIEW BOARD" and inserting
9	"SECURITY REVIEW COMMITTEE";
10	(2) in subsection (a)—
11	(A) by striking "Membership.—" and all
12	that follows through "Chairperson of the
13	Board. Members of the Board" and inserting
14	the following: "Membership.—
15	"(1) In general.—The Secretary shall deter-
16	mine the composition of the SRC and designate a
17	Chairperson. Members of the SRC";
18	(B) by striking "vested in the Board.
19	Members of the Board" and inserting "vested
20	in the SRC. Members of the SRC"; and
21	(C) by adding at the end the following new
22	paragraph:
23	"(2) Regulations.—The Secretary of State
24	shall promulgate regulations defining the member-
25	ship and operating procedures for the SRC and pro-

1	vide to the Chairmen and ranking members of the
2	Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and
3	the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
4	Representatives, in writing, a description of how the
5	SRC will be structured with respect to any other
6	standing committees."; and
7	(3) in subsection (b), by striking "Board" each
8	place it appears and inserting "SRC".
9	(c) Technical and Conforming Amendments.—
10	Section 303 of the Diplomatic Security Act (22 U.S.C.
11	4833) is amended—
12	(1) by striking "Board" each place it appears
13	and inserting "SRC"; and
14	(2) in the subsection heading for subsection (d).
15	by striking "Boards" and inserting "SRCs".
16	SEC. 5. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF SECURITY
17	REVIEW COMMITTEE.
18	Section 304 of the Diplomatic Security Act (22
19	U.S.C. 4834) is amended—
20	(1) in the section heading, by striking "A
21	BOARD" and inserting "THE SECURITY REVIEW
22	COMMITTEE";
23	(2) by striking "A Board" both places it ap-
24	pears and inserting "The Security Review Com-
25	mittee";

1	(3) by striking "Board" each place it appears
2	and inserting "Security Review Committee";
3	(4) in subsection (a)—
4	(A) in paragraph (2), by inserting after
5	"were adequate" the following: ", in the context
6	of the inherent security risks, mitigation efforts
7	and what was known at the time of the incident
8	in question, including—
9	"(A) if the attack was against a diplomatic
10	compound, motorcade, residence, or other mis-
11	sion facility, whether the security systems, secu-
12	rity countermeasures, and security procedures
13	operated as intended, and whether such systems
14	worked to materially mitigate the attack or
15	were found to be inadequate to mitigate the
16	threat and attack;
17	"(B) if the attack was on any personne
18	conducting an approved operation outside the
19	mission, if a valid process was followed in evalu-
20	ating the requested operation and weighing the
21	risk and diplomatic value of the operation; and
22	"(C) if gross negligence or serious breach
23	of duty by an individual described in section
24	303(a)(1)(B) may have been a factor.";

1	(B) in paragraph (4), by striking "; and
2	and inserting a semicolon;
3	(C) by redesignating paragraph (5) as
4	paragraph (6); and
5	(D) by inserting after paragraph (4) the
6	following new paragraph:
7	"(5) the diplomatic value of operations or phys
8	ical presence relating to the incident in question, in
9	cluding a counterfactual for the impact of not under
10	taking the type of operation or physical presence re
11	lated to the incident; and";
12	(5) in subsection (b), by inserting "and to pro
13	mote a culture of risk management, rather than risk
14	avoidance for valuable diplomatic activity" after
15	"has reviewed";
16	(6) by amending subsection (c) to read as fol
17	lows:
18	"(c) Personnel Recommendations.—If the SRC
19	suspects that an individual described in section
20	303(a)(1)(B) has engaged in gross negligence or serious
21	breach of duty, and such misconduct has significantly con
22	tributed to the serious injury, loss of life, or significant
23	destruction of property, or the serious breach of security
24	that is the subject of the SRC's examination as described
25	in subsection (a), the SRC shall report to the Director

1	General of the Foreign Service for any appropriate ac-
2	tion."; and
3	(7) in subsection (d)—
4	(A) by striking "REPORTS.—" and all that
5	follows through "(1) Program recommenda-
6	TIONS.—In any case" and inserting "RE-
7	PORTS.—In any case';
8	(B) by striking "Congress" and inserting
9	"Chairmen and ranking members of the Com-
10	mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and
11	the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
12	of Representatives"; and
13	(C) by striking paragraph (2).
14	SEC. 6. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.
15	Not later than 150 days after the date of the enact-
16	ment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide a
17	report and oral briefing to the Chairmen and ranking
18	members of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
19	Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
20	House of Representatives on the regulations promulgated
21	under paragraph (2) of section 302(a) of the Diplomatic
22	Security Act (22 U.S.C. 4832(a)), as added by section
23	4(b)(2)(C) of this Act.