WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator Chris Murphy (D-Conn.), top Democrat on the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism, on Tuesday questioned U.S. Department of State Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Joan Polaschik and U.S. Department of Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East Michael Mulroy, at a hearing on U.S. Iraq policy. Murphy pressed the Trump administration officials on the drawdown of U.S. embassy officials in Iraq and the fallout from the Trump administration’s designation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization at the subcommittee hearing.

“It’s hard to suggest that the threat is higher today than it was during the height of the insurgency and the fighting in and around Baghdad,” said Murphy. “If we maintain [only] a dozen or two dozen political staffers there, it is an invitation for ISIS to reemerge because we are not there helping the Iraqis do the hard lift of political reconciliation that ultimately protects our interests against the future rise of ISIS or a follow-on organization.”

Murphy continued: “I understand there to be a Venn diagram in which there are groups that have broad popular support and there are groups that have very close relationships with Iran. And those two circles overlap in big parts. And one of the concerns that I heard when we were there is that by forcing this choice, with the designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization, we are in fact pushing some groups that exist inside the overlap to Iran. Because those groups perceive the United States, again, to be a relatively short-term player and partner, [while] Iran is going to be around forever.”

Full transcript of Murphy’s exchanges with Polaschik and Mulroy below:

MURPHY: “Thank you very much Mr. Chairman again, thank you both for your service and for being here today.

“Mr. Mulroy, first I want to talk to you a little bit about the efficacy of our security assistance. The United States spent about $20 billion dollars on the Iraqi military between 2003 and 2011. Of course, then faced with a marching ISIS in 2014, an army of a quarter million just seemed to melt away.

“Since 2014, we've spent another $5 billion dollars. And so the logical question is what are we doing differently this time around to ensure that the same outcome doesn't repeat itself.

“But I mentioned in my opening statement another concern, which is that when we were there, one of our top commanders talked to us about the difficulty of getting large amounts of short term money out the door. We appropriate on an annual basis. We have given significant amounts of security assistance.

“And it worries me that it seems that many of our military—top military people there—are spending lots of time spinning their wheels just trying to get as much money out the door as quickly as possible, because they don't know whether it'll be there the next year. Leading one of these individuals to say to us, we'd rather have $100 million over 10 years than $100 million in one year, so that we can engage in long term projects.

“So,  my question is, what are we doing differently this time? What are the top line things we are doing differently? And is there a danger about not having a longer term commitment here, so that we can longer term military and security investments, rather than just speeding money out the door?”

MULROY: “Yes, sir. So, I would point out that in 2008, when we had 140,000 troops there, we were spending about $150 billion a year. Now in 2019, we're spending $15 billion a year. For me, that still sounds like a lot of money because it is. But, it's important to see that we have a trend in the right direction when it comes to the expenditures of taxpayer money.

“I would say one of the differences, when we saw the collapse of the military, the Iraqi military in 2014, to when we saw how they performed more recently [in] 17,18,19. One of the things they had, and that’s why I highlighted it in my opening, is the enabling component of the U.S. military.

“It is a game changer when you have air support conducted by the most effective Air Force in the world and we have advisors that can actually assist them on the ground and give them the confidence that they’ll be there in the height of the battle. I really do think that, in my estimation, is the game changer.

“When it comes to the specifics of the spending, as you requested. I think I've heard that a lot when it comes to government spending, everywhere. That there's a requirement to spend everything at the end of the particular fiscal year, and that oftentimes people spend. I think that's legitimate issue you raise, which also includes in a place like Iraq.

“From my perspective, everything we're trying to do now is move more to the economy of forces—which I’ve already highlighted we are—but also to a normalization. So we’ve established an SDO DATT, and we're moving toward a traditional country team model with the SDO DATT answering to the ambassador now—Ambassador Tueller. And we will start standardizing and modernizing and normalizing our spending as we do that.

“We're doing that with the Kurdish Peshmerga right now. And we obviously are going to be doing that when it comes to the rest of the Iraqi military—”

MURPHY: “We can solve that problem partially. Congress can do a multiyear authorization. It’s still an authorization subject to appropriation, but we can at least provide some of that certainty. And I would encourage our community to look into that.

“Ambassador Polaschik, I wanted you to address something else I brought up in my opening statement, which is a report over the weekend. A really concerning report suggesting that the embassy in Baghdad is down to 15 functional political staffers.

“Help me understand the conundrum I laid out in my opening remarks, which is, how do we maintain our political mission inside Baghdad, if we have pulled so many of our personnel out? Can you confirm that we're down to 15 functional political staffers in Baghdad, and if we were able to maintain a full diplomatic corps there during the height of the Iraq war in the 2000s, why can't we do the same today?

“The report from this weekend suggests that this is a permanent decision. That State has made a decision that they're going to keep this low level of staff for a time uncertain. And so given that report, I wondered if you could clarify some of that for the committee today.”

POLASCHIK: “Of course. First, I'd like to maybe go back just a couple of months to early May, where we faced a very serious, specific, credible threat stream against U.S. personnel in Iraq. And that threat stream has not diminished. It’s still there. So, that was the reason that Embassy Baghdad requested authorization to go to ordered departure status, and the Secretary of State approved that on May 14.

“This is a temporary situation. Ordered departure is something that is done in 30 day increments. We constantly evaluate the situation, looking carefully at the threat information that we have and the personnel on the ground and to make sure that we’ve got the right fit.

“And the Secretary just renewed the ordered departure status on July 12, for another 30 days. I would prefer not to go into specific numbers of personnel that we have on the ground in this open setting. But I'd be very, very happy to brief you later.

“I would note again, though, that this is just a temporary decision. We have not made any decisions to permanently withdraw staff. We are constantly evaluating the situation and it is certainly our hope that we are able to have a maximum presence on the ground in order to achieve all the important objectives that we have.”

MURPHY: “Certainly, without getting into classified threat assessment, I think it's hard to suggest that the threat is higher today than it was during the height of the insurgency and the fighting in and around Baghdad. And so while I would never second guess security decisions, I would hope that if there is a long term decision made to have lower levels of staffing there, that we start to think about how to increase security so that we can return to some level of political functionality.

“Because if we don't—if we [only] maintain a dozen or two dozen political staffers there, it is an invitation for ISIS to reemerge because we are not there helping the Iraqis do the hard lift of political reconciliation that ultimately protects our interests against the future rise of ISIS or a follow on organization.

“And so, I understand how sensitive this is because you're talking about the lives of American personnel there. But, the risk of a long term political withdrawal from Baghdad could—in the end—cost as many American lives as we're saving in the short run. And it's just something I hope the State Department is contemplating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.”

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MURPHY: “Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm trying to sneak two quick ones in here.

“Mr. Mulroy, you described the militias as sort of belonging to two categories and Ambassador Polaschick referenced the same. There's the group that enjoys popular support in Iraq, in part because of the good work they did against ISIS, and then there's a group that is directly aligned with Iran. And that's not how I understand it.

“I understand there to be a Venn diagram in which there are groups that have broad popular support and there are groups that have very close relationships with Iran. And those two circles overlap in big parts.

“And one of the concerns that I heard when we were there is that by forcing this choice, with the designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization, we are in fact pushing some groups that exist inside the overlap to Iran. Because those groups perceive the United States, again, to be a relatively short term player and partner, [while] Iran is going to be around forever.

“And so, by sort of pushing this question, in front of many of these militias that are popularly supported, and have relationships with Iran, we are actually working against our interests by pushing more of these groups towards Iran. They are not making the choice to align with us.

“Would you disagree with that assessment?”

POLASCHIK: “I fully agree with your assessment that it's a little squishier. That there are overlapping circles. And this is, it's an important question that the Iraqi Government is grappling with, and that we're grappling with as well. What is the best way to encourage good behavior from groups that fall into that middle area?

“There are several PMF groups who now have political parties, and they have members elected to the Council of Representatives. And so how can we encourage those groups to become good actors instead of bad actors. So, this is an ongoing policy debate within the administration.

“It's something that we're grappling with. But the intent is to do everything possible that we can to strengthen Iraq's sovereignty and its capacity to withstand threats to its sovereignty, both internal and external.

“So you've hit—I think—on one of the hot button issues that we continue to deliberate. And it’s very much on our minds.”

MURPHY: “I'm not speaking to either of you here. I think the administration has essentially already deliberated on this question, and has made a decision with respect the designation of the IRGC that makes all of your jobs much more difficult.

“Lastly, Mr. Chairman, if I can just ask one question on stabilization to build on Senator Shaheen’s question.

“I just have a hard time figuring out the math here. And again, this is a question of finite resources. But the estimate is that the rebuilding of places like West Mosul [and the rest of country], you know, are in the $80 billion range when you look at all of the work that needs to be done inside that country.

“And yet, we're appropriating about $250 million a year. And we've got commitments from other partners that get that number up to maybe about a billion dollars a year. I just don't know how that math works.

“If we're putting together a billion dollars—a quarter of that is our money, which by the way, represents about one quarter of 1% of the U.S. defense budget.

“How does Iraq put together the dollars to rebuild parts of that country, which are literally rubble today? Because again, if they don't rebuild, then it's part of the political impetus for ISIS to emerge. Is the rest of it all on them or is there hope that bigger numbers ride to the rescue from outside of the country.”

POLASCHIK: “There was the Iraq reconstruction pledging conference—perhaps that name isn’t accurate—but it was early in 2018, where there was significant pledges from key Arab countries.

“From the United States perspective, we've been very focused on immediate stabilization needs—getting the essential services back on, providing humanitarian assistance, working on justice and accountability. All of the measures that are required to allow people to come home.

“And yes, there are huge infrastructure needs that exist. But, I think one way to address that would be to also push forward on the economic reform agenda, because a lot of reconstruction—or a lot of construction writ large, development—can be done by the private sector, if there's a better business environment.

“I mean, there's serious money that could be made in Iraq. It's a wealthy country, in terms of its resources, in terms of its human capacity. So that's why we're also putting the effort on the regulatory reforms that will be required to create a more open, inviting business environment because Iraq is a statist economy still. 

“This is a very heavy legacy from the Saddam Hussein era. So whatever we can do to transition the Iraqi economy away from that heavy statist focus to more open market approach, I think will be better.”

MURPHY: “Senator Romney noted they don't help themselves when they continue to reject offers from Western companies—Western energy companies—to help them get a better return on their rate of investment in fossil fuels. So appreciate that answer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.”

 

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